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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The way in which rules and standards are applied either by the administrative 
authorities responsible for the enforcement of the various administrative sanctions or 
by courts, is a determinant contrivance that allows the behavior of individuals to fall 
within the proviso of legal rules.  
The main function of Justice, as part of the legal system, is the enforcement and 
implementation of the law. Unimplemented legal rules have no effect on the social life 
they intend to regulate, that is, to frame human behavior so as to maximize social 
welfare. 
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Our ground assumption considers that the behavior of individuals in relation to legal 
standards is the function of expected costs and benefits of lawful and unlawful 
alternatives.   
The highlight of this discussion focuses on the theoretical analysis of the effects of 
modifications to sanctions provided by law and the probability of their enforcement. The 
models of unlawful conduct (including criminal behavior) deem that the individual acts 
rationally on the basis of expected costs and benefits, therefore substantiating the 
principle of rationality.  
Under the concept of costs and benefits one can integrate those of material, 
psychological or moral nature. Theories of crime - more extensively theories of legal 
offenses - are abundant and are all based on factors of mental, physical, economic and 
cultural nature among others. 
Over the last four decades the study of law and economics (also known as the 
economic analysis of law) has been developed, consisting in applying the methods of 
economics to law, which are based on the principle of rationality.  
PRINCIPLE OF RATIONALITY AND INCENTIVES 
The principle of rationality can be defined as follows: the individual seeks to maximize 
pleasure, utility, satisfaction, and self-interest while minimizing costs, disutility and 
displeasure. Simply put, the individual is a maximizer.  
Usually, the rationality of individuals entails that whenever a conflict between the 
general interest and self-interests emerges, individuals tend to satisfy their own 
interests in detriment of the general interest. Already epitomized by Adam Smith2 in 
Wealth of Nations in his famous metaphor of the "Invisible Hand", which embodies the 
principle of rationality: 
“Many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part 
of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was not part of it. 
By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much 
good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, 
indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be 
employed in dissuading them from it.” 
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Assuming that individuals pursue their own interests does not mean that they are 
"frigid" or "selfish" in a moral sense; it means that their behavior is based on the 
rational choice model whether it is motivated by ideological convictions or the benefit 
and satisfaction obtained in contributing towards the happiness of others, it is all in the 
profit of our own personal interest (they are components of the utility function or 
happiness function). The happiness of other persons contributes (and most often it 
does!) for our own satisfaction. In this sense nothing is disinterested. There is always 
interest even when acting at a non-material level and still when this interest merely 
reflects moral or psychological satisfaction withdrawn from decisions and behavior.  
Thus, the utility function of a person (i.e. level of satisfaction) depends on all the 
material and non-material goods that person "consumes". The underlying rationality in 
the economic analysis of law does not infer a conscious calculation for all situations 
and choices made by the individual. 
As stated by Gary Becker3"["4. 
“…human behavior is not compartmentalized, sometimes based on 
maximization, sometimes not, sometimes motivated by stable preferences, 
sometimes by volatile ones, sometimes resulting, in an optimal accumulation of 
information, sometimes not. Rather, all human behavior can be viewed as 
involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences 
and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of 
markets.” 
This passage from Professor Gary Becker reveals that the subject matter of economics 
is non- compartmentalized human behavior and that it can be applied to law. Non-
market goods that seem not to appear related to the economy, only by mistake may be 
understood as such. Indeed, moral, ethical, religious and social values inculcated in 
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individuals throughout their socialization process are goods that directly affect an 
individual's behavior and that can and ought to be studied.  
As corollaries of the principle of rationality we underline the following:  
a) Wanting more rather than less is preferable in all that provides satisfaction to the 
individual; 
b) No one other than the individual knows best what gives him more pleasure; 
individuals know best what their preferences are and assign value to objects and their 
actions; 
c) Free will as an assumption of free choice;  
d) “Equilibrium” – interpreted as the pursuit of maximizing utility - impels individuals to 
alter their behavior in their social relations provided that their situation will improve with 
this change;  
e) The individual reacts to incentives.  
Based on these assumptions the theory developed by the economic analysis of law 
considers that individuals' choices are not random but instead decision-making is 
based on the expected results of a certain behavior or action, whether lawful or 
unlawful, under uncertainty and risk. Individuals make rational choices based on their 
personal equation.  
In effect, all the choices of life are accompanied by a certain high or low degree of risk 
and of which are influenced by individuals' attitudes towards risk. These attitudes have 
great importance to the study of the effectiveness of the Law.  
Granted that potential offenders of the law are rational in their decisions on whether or 
not to practice an unlawful act, individuals compare the costs and benefits of the 
different outcomes of their actions, including the risk of punishment, the possibility of 
social reprimand and psychological costs (moral costs). The unlawful act will only be 
committed if the expected benefits offset the expected total costs.  
SELF-INTEREST AND PREDICTIONS 
The premise that individuals pursue self-interest (rationality) allows the social analyst to 
predict human behavior in response to changes in stimuli (incentives) allowing for the 
elaboration of a valid behavioral model, whose utility depends on its ability to explain 
social phenomena, that is, proof of its efficacy shall be attained by contrasting the 
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results of the model’s appliance to observed human behavior. To avoid confusion, the 
model aforementioned does not limit itself to quotidian individual models nor a small 
geographical area or short period of time. Instead, it is a general model that gathers a 
limited set of characteristics common to human behavior.  
ALL INDIVIDUALS APPRAISE  
Individuals are interested and concerned with just about everything in life: knowledge, 
independence, well-being of others, environment, honor, personal relationships, status, 
love, friendship, social standards, conduct, culture, wealth, time, music, art, religion and 
so on. Still, we are continuously making choices and substitutions offering a certain 
quantity of a given good in exchange for a quantity of another good and/or goods with 
greater value to us whether it be material or non-material (e.g. money, honor, safety). 
In this perspective appraisal is always relative given that the marginal value of a good 
tends to decrease as its quantity increases. On these grounds proponents of such view 
have defended the transitivity of preferences.   
INDIVIDUALS ADAPT TO CHANGE  
Everyone recognizes that in general individuals are capable of conceiving change in 
their surroundings. They are able to predict, although stochastically, the consequences 
of their actions and choices responding by creating new opportunities. The fact that at 
any given moment a person may be confined to limited options, knowledge or 
environment does not necessarily imply that the current situation is immutable. In fact, 
humans are able to find alternative means of action creating activities that broaden 
their possibilities in different directions.  Economic theory assigns probabilities -
expected values- to diverse actions selecting the one that has greater value (i.e., 
expected utility) for the individual.   
One way to verify this ability to create new opportunities is to observe the effects that 
imposed restrictions enacted in new laws have on human behavior Legal rules - 
substantive and adjective – and the functioning of legal institutions create incentives 
that affect behavior in such a manner that on certain occasions not even legislators are 
able to predict.  
When faced with new restrictions, individuals seek substitutive goods replacing the 
good whose cost – including shadow prices - has been altered although without 
confining the search to existing alternatives. From this angle, a legal provision may be 
relatively ineffective in terms of costs due to the individual’s choice of substitutive 
goods.  
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ACTING UNDER UNCERTAINTY  
It is a noteworthy fact that humans can never fully predict the results of their actions 
and choices, wherefore all decisions contain some risk5. The process of human life is 
stochastic, a concept substantiated in the uncertainty that stems from the various 
outcomes that can be observed from a “to do” or “not do” decision. 
Determinism - opposed to a stochastic process - is that which does not exist during the 
process of human life. We are not certain of the consequences of personal relations 
that we establish at any level, the outcome of a trip in advance, the outcome of a 
financial investment, the time certain events take, even natural, nor their magnitude. In 
sum, we live in constant uncertainty. But this is the process of human life, we do not 
question it, it just is.  
II 
LAW AND OTHER REGULATORY SYSTEMS 
Law is a random variable with an expected value, meaning that its enforcement is 
uncertain although it depends on the probability of its implementation which is less than 
one. An expected value of a random variable is defined as the integral of the random 
variable with respect to its probability measure.  
INCENTIVES, AXIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR   
All human decisions begin with a mental representation where the effects of actions 
and/or behavior are not known in advance with upmost certainty. All actions and 
behavior contain a higher or lower degree of risk. Life, therefore, consists in a 
stochastic process which entails uncertainty and risk. 
An individual acting rationally under uncertainty – characteristic of life in of itself - with 
available information and in line with his personal equation, seeks to attain the outcome 
that best meets his or her interests, to be precise, utility.  
One may associate probability to risk. The probability that the individual assigns to 
possible anticipated outcomes is subjective probability, which may diverge more or 
less from objective probability due to the individual’s disregard of all factors. 
                                                          
5
 Wilde, Geralde J. S.; (1994) Target Risk, p.1. PDE Publications, Toronto, Canada 
 7 
Axiological systems - moral, ethical, social and religious – play a key role in decision-
making by means of self-imputed sanctions (costs) as well as rewards obtained from 
law-abidance. These sanctions are divided into two sorts: 
a) One of intrinsic nature which results in guilt ("price") felt by the individual when 
violating an axiological rule, whose intensity varies according to the order of 
offended values and the degree of adherence to those values instilled in the 
individual. An individual who is motivated to avoid feelings of guilt can be 
described as willingly honest and thus gains utility from his behavior. Hence, 
emotions and feelings (which we treat as preferences) influence behavior. 
One critique to the aforesaid is the Cartesian dualism between reason and 
emotion which led to the creation of the homo economicus and has distanced 
the overall analysis of behavior from the various sorts of intrinsic motivations of 
behavioral economics as well as other sciences that study the human being. 
Emotions are part of individuals’ psychological structure and are also somehow 
related to the values inculcated during the socialization process, affecting an 









b)     Another sanction is of extrinsic nature, that is, the criticism or threat of 
punishment the individual is subject to by the other members of society, to 
which the individual may be more or less sensitive depending on his values, 
beliefs and knowledge.  
Likewise, the positive incentives of axiological rules brought forth as a result of the 
behavioral adjustment of individuals to the rules of these systems truly have effects on 
behavior. 
PERSONAL EQUATION – We use the term Personal Equation to 
represent a set of beliefs, values and subjective knowledge. The 
personal equation determinately influences the behavior of the 
individual, varying spatially and diachronically. It is dynamic, meaning 
that new knowledge, beliefs and values inculcated in individuals alter 
behavior. 
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THE LEGAL SYSTEM AS A SET OF INCENTIVES  
Aside from the axiological systems mentioned the legal system may be understood as 
a set of incentives - positive and negative - acting upon the behavior of individuals 
although different from the former given that the infringement of its rules can be 
coercively sanctioned by the State.  
LAW IS A RANDOM VARIABLE WITH AN EXPECTED VALUE. EXPECTED 
SANCTION  
Law is a random variable with an expected value in the extent that the sanction 
imposed for the violation of legal rules is merely probable. This implies that the 
enforcement of a legal sanction depends on the awareness of such by the competent 
authorities, proof of its performance and the efficacy of judicial and enforcement 
systems. 
In fact, the effectiveness of a legal rule does not emerge directly from it being in force 
instead it concurrently depends on the probability of its enforcement.   
Regarding law as an expected value implies that the effectiveness of rules depends on 
the product of the magnitude of sanctions (or rewards) provided for in the law and the 
probability of their enforcement. Thus, sanctions (or awards) stipulated in legal rules 
are not per se the incentives that act upon individuals. Such incentives are 
incorporated in the expected sanction which is the outcome that results from the 
sanction foreseen in the law multiplied by its probability of enforcement. In this regard 
we cite Santos Pastor6:  
"The law is an expected value ... what matters is not so much what the rules say 
but what the rules "do", - the role they actually play; this is why it is crucial to 
know how rules are applied and to what extent. " 
To illustrate this in a formal and simple way the EXPECTED SANCTION is expressed 
by the following equation:  
Se = S* p 
Where: 
Se – denotes the expected sanction;  
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 Pastor Prieto, Santos. Sistema Jurídico y Economía. Una Introducción al Análisis Económico del 
Derecho. Madrid: Tecnos, 1989, p. 28. Translated.  
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S - is the maximum possible sanction provided by law;  
p - represents the probability of law enforcement.  
Such representation suggests that regardless of a high sanction provided by law (S), if 
the probability of law enforcement or apprehension (p) is low, the expected sanction 
will also be low. 
Consider, hypothetically, that the maximum possible sanction set out in the Highway 
Code for driving under the influence with a blood alcohol level (BAC) of 0.8 g/ liter of 
blood is 500 Euros (S = 500 € ). If the probability of apprehension in a particular 
geographical area, is 20 percent (p = 0.20), the stimuli, thereof, for the individual is 
represented by the expected sanction (Se) which in our example would be 100 € (= 500 
€ * 0.20).  
We veraciously accept "rational" behavior as an assumption in our analysis – admitting 
to the fact that rationality of individuals is limited by the information available to them 
(bounded rationality7) – whereupon individuals are led to make choices so as to 
maximize their well-being, where not only is "reason" - in the Cartesian dualist sense - 
a determinant factor but also “emotions”8, either basic or developed during the 
socialization process, that relate to the structure of values and beliefs (personal 
equation) of the individual. Cartesian dualism has been the basis for the severance 
between mind and body carried out in the various branches of science, including 
economics, creating an abstract fiction known as the "Homo Economicus" whose 
decision-making is based on reason alone, completely detached from feelings and 
emotions. "Emotions are like a compass, they are there to guide us in the right 
direction. What good is a compass that is always stuck on north? Your emotions are 
meant to fluctuate, just like your blood pressure is meant to fluctuate. It is a system that 
is supposed to move back and forth, between happy and unhappy. That is how the 
system guides you through the world”9.  
 
III 
MAXIMUM SANCTION, MINIMUM PROBABILITY 
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 Simon, Herbert A. (1955) – A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. Vol LXIX, February, 1955.  
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--------- Damásio, António: O Sentimento de Si. - Publicações Europa-América –Lisbon (2000) 
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3.1 THEORY AND CRITICISM  
Gary Becker, in his famous article, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach" 
(1968), argued that society can reduce social costs by reducing the costs of law 
enforcement (probability of apprehension) without sacrificing the level of deterrence. By 
increasing the sanctions provided in the law and reducing the probability of 
apprehension (detection and enforcement), the level of deterrence would remain 
unchanged while saving enforcement resources and reducing costs. The primary 
objective is to answer the normative question regarding the resources that ought to be 
used and the sanctions that should be employed to enforce the different types of laws 
in an effective and efficient manner. The probability of enforcement and punishments - 
in addition, their degree of severity - should be determined so as to minimize the social 
costs derived from unlawful conduct.  
If certain conditions were to be verified (especially if individuals are risk neutral), 
sanctions –primarily fines - should be set at the highest feasible level and limited by the 
wealth of the individual whereas probability of apprehension should be minimal since in 
this manner the social costs would be minimized and the expected sanction (which is 
the product of the imposed legal sanction multiplied by the probability of apprehension) 
would remain fixed at a constant level. This argument was ostensibly explained by 
Gary Becker.  
A simplified form of the theory assumes that potential offenders accurately observe the 
objective probability of apprehension and correctly anticipate the expected sanction; 
meaning that actors have perfect or near perfect information, situation which rarely 
happens. The lack of information – imperfect information - has obvious consequences 
that generate inefficient outcomes. Further, the theory also assumes that individuals 
are risk neutral. In fact, individuals are not fully informed about the magnitude of the 
A field where Gary Becker has applied the theory of rational behavior has been crime and its 
punishment, he writes:  
“A criminal, with the exception of a limited number of psychopaths, is assumed to 
react to different stimuli in a predictable ("rational") way, both with respect to returns 
and costs, such as in the form of expected punishment. Instead of regarding criminal 
activity as irrational behavior associated with the specific psychological and social 
status of an offender, criminality is analyzed as rational behavior under uncertainty.” 
“Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 1968”, and in “Essays in the 
Economics of Crime and Punishment, 1974.” 
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applicable sanction for a particular offense given that it is subject to variance between a 
minimum and a maximum.  
They may also lack a complete understanding of the social harm (including not only 
externalities but also internalized damages) caused when adopting socially inefficient 
behavior, that is, non-optimal behavior.  
In addition, bounded rationality is another factor to take into account when determining 
the magnitude of sanctions and their probability. 
3.2 ATTITUDES TOWARDS RISK  
However, beyond the limitations aforementioned we must consider that the behavior of 
individuals is teleologically determined not by wealth or income (as composite 
variables) per se but by the expected utility or satisfaction they provide, implying that 
we must consider individuals' attitude towards risk when determining the optimal 
sanction, which we know varies subjectively and can either be risk-neutrality, risk-
aversion or risk-seeking. 
3.2.1. RISK-NEUTRALITY  
Since risk-neutral individuals maximize both the expected value of results (Egi) and 
expected utility U [E (gi)] - suggesting that both the sanction and its probability have 
equal influence on the level of deterrence – it’s  fair to consider that the probability of 
detection of an offense and apprehension, in a broad sense, should be as low as 
possible and the magnitude of the sanction S (severity) should be at the highest 
feasible level, with a maximum equal to the wealth (W) of the offender, (S = W ) in 
order to maximize the social function, scilicet, minimize social costs.  
 
The aggregate of instruments of direct risk management policy of driver behavior 
(probability and sanction) results in the expected sanction (Se = S* p). For risk-neutral 
individuals, if the fine is less than its maximum (maximum equal to an individual’s 
wealth) and the intent is to increase the expected sanction, then society could reduce 
social costs by increasing the fine (severity) to a maximum so as to offset or 
compensate the decrease in probability (thus reducing the costs of law enforcement) 
without eventually affecting the level of deterrence10. In doing so, society obtains the 
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 Becker, Gary. Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 1968, 
No. 76-2, pp. 169-217. 
A risk-neutral individual will act unlawfully if the probability of enforcement is lower than 
th  ratio between expected private gai s (g) and the fine (p < g/S), in other words, if private 
gains exceed the expected sanction (g > p*S)  
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optimal expected sanction that best minimizes social costs.  
 
Risk-neutral individuals compare the expected benefits of violating rules to the 
expected sanction. 
 
3.2.1.1. CRITICISM OF THE MAXIMUM SANCTION, MINIMUM PROBABILITY 
MODEL  
Several critical remarks can be made to this standpoint in what pertains to the 
argument of a maximum sanction (equal to the individual’s wealth) and a minimum 
probability:  
a) The assumption of risk neutrality is implausible in situations where individuals would 
face the risk of losing all their wealth by engaging in activities that impose low external 
costs; 
b) If the magnitude of fines (severity) is disproportionate in relation to social harm, this 
would affect the social value of “JUSTICE” and the effects may be adverse. The values 
of a society, including vertical and horizontal equity, should be taken into account on 
the grounds that, quote, "... one can not ignore the negative distributional effects of a 
policy measure and exclusively focus on its effects of efficiency, even if it is in terms of 
potential efficiency”(Santos Pastor)11;   
c) Moreover, since wealth varies substantially among individuals, given a constant 
severity level of fines for all offenders, the optimal fine would tend be less than 
maximum. If it were greater than the wealth12 of lower income individuals, an increase 
in severity combined with a reduction in probability - maintaining the expected sanction 
constant - would result in under-deterrence for those individuals unable to pay the 
fine13;  
d) Individuals have imperfect information regarding the probability of apprehension 
where in many cases estimates are to low while in others they are too high. This 
means that subjective probability differs from objective probability which implies the 
existence of perception errors [with endogenous determinants] with negative effects on 
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 Pastor, Santos (1989) - Sistema Jurídico y Economía. Una Introducción al Análisis Económico del 
Derecho. Madrid: Tecnos,. p. 34. Translated. 
12
 Polinsky, Mitchell and Steven Shavell (1991), "A Note on Optimal Fines when Wealth Varies Among 
Individuals," American Economic Review, 81, 618-621. 
13
 Bar-Ilan, Avner; Sacerdote, Bruce. The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of 
Experiments. Working Paper No. 8638. National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2001.  
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optimal behavior. A high degree of uncertainty in regard to the probability of 
apprehension generates and promotes errors that are inversely related to the actual 
probability, i.e., the lower the actual probability the greater the size of the error. These 
relative errors may be minimized through individual experience due to a higher actual 
probability, considering that it is not static but rather dynamic. Consequently, the 
increase in resources allocated towards increasing the probability of detection of an 
offense and apprehension (administratively and judicially) and the decrease in the 
magnitude of fines can lead to more efficient behavior and as a result the expected 
sanction will tend to optimum.  
e) If sanctions are set at extremely high levels, disproportionate to social costs, 
individuals will tend to develop evasive behavior more intensively in order to conceal 
illegal activities in which they engage. If the fine is too high, the potential offender will 
tend to raise fixed costs so as to avoid being caught engaging in externality creating 
activities, which, once incurred become sunk costs, and do not influence the potential 
offender's decision in relation to unlawful behavior. If the variable costs associated with 
unlawful behavior decrease (these which influence the potential offender's decision) 
the effect may be adverse.  
f) By engaging several times in unlawful behavior, individuals who are fined 
occasionally (or just controlled) have the opportunity to obtain information on the actual 
probability of apprehension, which tends to reduce the discrepancy between subjective 
probability (perceived by potential offenders) and objective probability. This implies that 
reducing the fine below its maximum and increasing the probability of apprehension 
tends to be more efficient; increasing the level of general and specific deterrence.  
In fact, information errors (such as those pertaining to objective probability) lead 
individuals to act and make decisions under a situation of disequilibrium. An increase in 
probability reinforces the dynamic component of the enforcement process, resulting in 
behavior that tends to adjust itself to equilibrium. This consists in drawing closer 
together personal estimates (subjective probability) to objective probability and, through 
this medium, induce individuals to adopt behavior that tends towards optimum.  
Increased control combined with more effective law enforcement tends to foster the 
inculcation of certain socially significant values in individuals, changing the desired 
level of risk (target risk) and consequently, behavior.  
In the long run this increase in deterrence caused by an increase in the objective 
probability of apprehension tends to create additional social benefits by stimulating 
individuals to act more efficiently.  
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g) Since the probability of apprehension and conviction also depends on judicial delay 
(in litigious cases) the greater the delay the greater the temporal discount rate of 
fines, entailing a reduction in the expected sanction, therefore lowering the level of 
deterrence14. 
3.2.2. RISK AVERSION  
Risk aversion implies that when individuals act under uncertainty their expected utility 
is lower than the expected utility of certain returns or payoffs, although the expected 
tangible value of the results is the same.   
For individuals who are risk adverse15, the level of deterrence is the not the same for all 
the different combinations of probability and magnitude of fines in regard to the same 
expected value. As long as certain conditions are verified, the greater the sanction’s 
severity the higher will be the level of deterrence for these individuals due to the risk 
premium they are wiling to sustain, which we know to increase with the absolute 
degree of risk. Furthermore, the degree of risk aversion - for those who are risk-
adverse - is inversely related to an individual’s wealth.   
 
Given the risk premium willingly borne by these individuals, the total supported 
sanction (ST) (aside from the internal and external moral sanction) shall be equal to the 
legal sanction (S) plus the risk premium () which reflects the cost of risk per se (ST = S 
+), implying that the optimal sanction (as well as the expected legal sanction) must be 
less than maximum. Note that the opposite scenario would lead to overdeterrence 
which would result in inefficiency. In all, the effect of risk on the welfare of individuals 
depends on three factors: the risk in itself, wealth (which directly affects the degree of 
absolute risk) and the individual’s utility function. 
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 Polinsky, Mitchell and Steven Shavell (1999), “On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment and 
the Theory of Deterrence,” Journal of Legal Studies, 28, 1-16 
15
 Polinsky, A.M.; Shavell, S. The Optimal... Id., p. 880. 
ABSOLUTE RISK AVERSION   
Absolute risk aversion (ARA) is a measure of risk aversion. For risk adverse individuals, the 
absolute degree of risk varies inversely with wealth. Therefore, differences in wealth have an 
influence on behavior. 
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When individuals are risk adverse, the risk premium (which is part of the total 
supported cost) varies in the same direction of the legal sanction and inversely with the 
probability of apprehension.  
The risk adverse individual will violate legal rules if and only if the expected utility of 
engaging in the activity outweighs the disutility (cost) that derives from the expected 
legal sanction plus the risk premium. The greater the severity of fines and the lower the 
probability, the greater the uncertainty and the “cost of risk” borne by these individuals. 
This indicates that the severity of sanctions in the case of risk adverse individuals can 
be lower than the maximum (i.e. less than wealth).  
Since the decrease in the level of risk-bearing by individuals (including by those who 
adopt law-abidingness behavior) is a social benefit, increasing the probability and 
reducing the severity of fines achieves this objective. Nevertheless, an increase in 
probability suggests an increment of deterrence costs. Resultantly, there is a conflict 
between minimizing costs related to risk and minimizing the costs of increased 
probability. Consequently, optimal probability is that which best minimizes the sum of 
both costs (risk and probability).  
For any given level of deterrence, the cost of risk-bearing can be reduced by 
decreasing the severity and increasing probability. The optimal magnitude of fines – 
inferior to the maximum feasible fine - depends on the offset between social benefits 
obtained from risk reduction and the marginal costs of the increased probability. 
In conclusion: in cases of risk-aversion, an effective combination of law enforcement 
has the following characteristics:  
a)  Sanction severity is not set at its highest feasible level; 
b)  Probability shall be greater than that of risk neutrality cases. 
An efficient situation entails that deterrence is not complete. Only those individuals to 
whom private gains from unlawful conduct exceed the external costs will engage in 
externality creating activity.  
When the sanctions provided by law are already high, marginal increments will be less 
effective than increases in the probability of apprehension wherefore, according to the 
"ratio-difference principle”16 – a psychophysical effect - the impact of any fixed positive 
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 Quattronc, George A. e Amos Tversky in “Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of 
Political Choice” – The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 3 (Sep. 1988) 719-736, Study 
pertaining to the Prospet Theory.  
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difference between two amounts increases with their ratio. When the sanction 
(severity) is already high, its marginal increase will have a diminutive effect since the 
ratio is small.  
Another factor that justifies high probability and low sanction severity is legal error 
committed by courts. These errors increase the risk imposed, not only upon individuals 
who violate the law but also others, generating social cost.  
3.2.3. RISK-SEEKING INDIVIDUALS 
In the case of risk-seeking individuals, an identical percentage change in probability 
and severity can have the same effect on expected wealth but have different effects on 
the expected utility of an offense and, consequently, the level of deterrence. 
Increased severity triggers two effects: a substitution effect and an income effect. The 
substitution effect - caused by increased sanction severity - consists in less unlawful 
behavior. The sign (positive or negative) of the income effect depends on individuals’ 
attitude towards risk. For risk-prone individuals the income effect is positive. In their 
case, an increase in potential severity for breaking rules generates a substitution effect 
in favor of law-abidingness but also yields a positive income effect more than enough 
to offset the substitution effect, therefore generating a total positive effect in favor of 
illegal activity. The efficacy of increasing probability tends to be greater than that of 
increasing severity. The expected reduction of income due to increased severity – 
when put in practice - may cause the individual to increase illegal activity.  This occurs 
whenever the income effect outweighs the substitution effect. 
Reducing the probability (p) and increasing the sanction (S) beyond a certain point will 
be counterproductive, where an increase in the expected utility of illegal behavior will 
reduce deterrence. Thus, for risk-seeking individuals, it is more effective to increase 





4.1. In view of what is allegedly credited to Gary Becker regarding his insight on 
optimal enforcement policy, where "maximum sanction -minimum probability" is that 
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which – in theory - leads to the optimal sanction, we advance with some critical 
considerations.  
We argue that the assumptions of this rule are rarely verified due to the several 
reasons already mentioned. Among these we draw attention to the fact that many 
individuals aren’t risk-neutral and are either risk-adverse or risk-prone. These attitudes 
towards risk generate different effects when changing the combination of probability 
and sanction in order to obtain the same level of expected sanction. In the case of risk-
seeking individuals, an increase in the probability will usually tend to be more effective 
than raising the severity of sanctions (an assumption also accepted by Becker).  
However, many of the developed models founded on the theory of expected utility 
allow us to deduce that risk-neutral individuals when confronted with the choice 
between legal or illegal behavior, shall choose to violate the law whenever the 
expected sanction (S*p) is less than the expected private gain (g) obtained from 
committing an illegal act (S*P < g). Since these individuals maximize both the expected 
value of results and expected utility, it would be preferable – in this particular case - to 
raise the sanction to its maximum and lower the probability to its minimum. 
Nonetheless, due to the reasons already explained, even in this scenario this method 
would be inefficient.   
Bearing in mind the degree of constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA), some authors17 
have shown that in relation to risk-adverse individuals there will always be a level at 
which legal sanctions have some deterrent effects even under low probabilities of 
apprehension.  
In respect to risk-seeking individuals, these models attest the fact that when the 
expected gain of illegal behavior is high or the probability of apprehension and 
conviction is too small, there is no deterrence possible even if the prescribed sanction 
is at its highest level.  
Since it is the expected utility (or disutility) of actions that determine the behavior of 
individuals and since three risk attitudes are possible when choosing between legal or 
illegal behavior:  preference, non-preference or indifference, we must take into account 
the level at which the individual’s estimate of probability (subjective probability) makes 
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him indifferent between engaging in and abstaining from illegal activity. This probability 
is what we call THRESHOLD PROBABILITY18 19.  
The case of indifference between engaging in and abstaining from illegal activity can 
be written as: 
pt U (W1) + (1-p
t) U (W2) = U(X0) 
Where:  
pt – is threshold probability;  
U – is the utility (satisfaction) of an action or certain behavior;  
W1 – is the state of success (which comprises the positive result of an illegal act 
for the offender);    
W2 – is the state of failure (which comprises the negative result of an illegal act 
for the offender, 
 p – is effective probability. 
The consideration of this probability implies that regardless of the attitude of individuals 
towards risk [neutral, adverse or prone], if effective probability is positive but below 
threshold probability, the efficacy of sanctions provided by the law - in spite of their high 
magnitude - will be low or even null, given the system of moral values (in a broad 
sense) inculcated in individuals.  
The notion of threshold probability signifies that if effective probability is lower than 
threshold probability, the magnitude of sanctions provided by the law shall be 
ineffective, leading to a situation where the benefits (utility) of engaging in illegal activity 
are greater than those of law-abidingness. Conversely, if effective probability is greater 
than threshold probability the efficacy of law enforcement tends to be high.    
In order to reduce the number of offenses (namely crimes) the theory of threshold 
probability makes it evident that in spite of the attitude of individuals towards risk, 
increased probability of apprehension and conviction is more effective than increasing 
the magnitude of sanctions, especially when the effective probability is lower than 
threshold probability. 
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As stated above, the same holds true in the case of risk-seeking individuals. Withal, 
even when the effective probability is greater than threshold probability, the most 
effective tool in combating offenses is increased probability of apprehension and 
conviction which also includes the reduction of judicial delay. In effect - in situations of 
risk seeking - increasing the magnitude of sanctions while maintaining or reducing 
effective probability is counterproductive in relation to the desired effects, in other 
words, an increase in the magnitude of the sanctions under low probability of 
enforcement tends to increase the number of offenses (especially the crime rate). 
This inefficiency can be mitigated if individuals have instilled moral values - ethical and 
social - that when breached, have corresponding "penalties" and "rewards" which can 
either be intrinsic incentives (feeling of guilt of disorderly conduct and satisfaction of 
law-abidingness) and extrinsic incentives (social approval or reprimand).  
These "civic" values are determinants of persistent social and law-abiding behavior 
with respect for the moral and physical integrity of others.  
Finally, the increase in probability may be carried out in various ways such as 
increasing control by law enforcement officials and increasing the efficiency and 
expeditiousness of courts.   
4.2 EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
In an empirical study conducted20 concerning the determinants of road traffic accidents 
involving fatalities and injuries, by using econometric models we were able to obtain 
evidence to substantiate that several variables integrating these models were not 
statistically significant, mainly those pertaining to the rules that govern speeding and 
driving under the influence (BAC ≥ 1.2 g/l). These results indicate that many drivers are 
risk-seeking and as a result an increase in the magnitude of penalties provided by law 
shall be ineffective if the probability of apprehension is low and inferior to threshold 
probability. This is extensive to the case of risk-adverse and risk-neutral drivers.  
Moreover, according to the theory discussed above, even in relation to risk-adverse or 
risk-neutral individuals the results of the model reveal that if the probability of 
apprehension for traffic offenses - such as speeding – is less than threshold probability, 
an increase in the magnitude of fines will be ineffective. 
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However, the policy of "Zero Tolerance" (included in our models as an explanatory 
variable of accidents involving fatalities and injuries) was implemented on several 
roads (stretches of road) during a period of time, showing signs of statistical 
significance in all models. This policy resulted in increased probability of apprehension 
and a constant magnitude of fines. This was enough to decrease the number of 
accidents and their consequences. This result attests the tenet that increased 
probability is, in the short run, a far more effective policy than increasing the magnitude 





When choosing between legal and illegal conduct, individuals take into account not 
only the expected legal penalties and rewards but also contemplate the axiological 
"sanctions" and "rewards" which emerge from the moral, ethical, social and religious 
values inculcated in them during the process of socialization, where “education” plays a 
key role. Strictly speaking, it is the overall penalty or reward that determines the 
individual’s decision on whether or not to abide by the law.  
In the long run, education can play a crucial role in modifying individual preferences in 
what pertains to law-abiding behavior.  
As mentioned, increased probability of apprehension and conviction also has an 
informative role and, if persistent, could lead to the inculcation of desired social values. 
Undeniably, it is a known fact that individuals from different countries do not share the 
same attitude towards law-abidingness and that their attitudes reflect their culture and 
values.  
In countries where there is less internalization of respect for the law there is bound to 
be a greater tendency to engage in offenses and corruption that entail a reduction in 
deterrence. As a final note, it should be point out that even when legal sanctions are 
high and the probability of their implementation is low there will be a greater propensity 
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